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1. Background 
 
Participation of employees in decision-making in Lithuanian companies has its roots in 
trade union movement as well as in the practice of managing companies under Soviet 
rule. After Lithuania regained independence, employee ownership was used to facilitate 
privatization. A notable success was establishment of a number of employee-owned 
companies that were formerly state-owned enterprises during the first stage of 
privatization. However, no stronger tradition of employee participation has evolved. 
Current legal regulation of participation of employees - financial participation, as well 
as participation in decision-making - is not well developed and does not provide for 
stronger incentives. The solution of current employment and social problems by the 
Government, ruling parties as well as social partners is not associated with a higher 
level of participation of employees. Financial participation is viewed mainly as a way of 
employee motivation as initiated by managers and current owners of companies. 
 
a) History 
Participation of employees has a short history in Lithuania related first to co-operative 
movement and later to the privatization process, especially in the first half of the 90ies. 
Though the start of co-operative activities dates back to the year 1869, when the first 
co-operative society was founded in Lithuania, the Law on Co-operative Societies and 
their Union was passed only in 1919. In 1920 the Lithuanian Union of Co-operative 
Societies was founded (LKBS), followed by the establishment of the Lithuanian Union 
of Agricultural Co-operative Societies ‘Lietūkis’ in 1923. Co-operative movement in 
agriculture was connected to collective use of equipment for farming and co-operatives 
for processing agricultural products. Both in the rural areas and in the cities there were 
also some crafts co-operatives. In 1940, the Union of Lithuanian Consumers’ Co-
operative Societies (LCCU) was established on the basis of ‘Lietūkis’, which played an 
important role in providing people with goods, increasing co-operative property and 
purchasing agricultural products from farmers.2 During the period of socialism credit, 
agricultural and other types of co-operative societies disappeared. The only co-
operative organization remaining was Lithuanian Consumers’ Co-operative Societies 
Union (LCCU). 
In the late 80ies many new co-operatives were formed as small service and production 
units. In 1990, new co-operatives made up around 4500 enterprises with about 5% of 
the total workforce. Law on Enterprises from 1990 did not include co-operatives as 
the official legal form of the enterprises, thus they were transformed into partnerships 
or closed joint-stock companies (see Mygind, 1995, p. 264).  
In 1993, the Parliament passed the Law on co-operation (later co-operative societies), 
and legalised co-operative activities and ownership. In 1995, co-operative enterprises 
                                                 
2  http://www.komunikacija.Litas/pranesimai/05%2003%2003%20(LIETOOPSAJUNGA).htm. 
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covering many of the new co-operatives were reorganised into partnerships or limited 
liability companies. The main functions of consumer co-operation union became 
coordination of actions between the members, providing them with services via co-
operative enterprises and representing their interests in governmental institutions and 
international organisations, as well as increasing their economic capacity. In addition to 
general activities, such as trade, baking and canning industry, Lithuanian consumers’ 
co-operatives were dealing with the purchase of agricultural products and second hand 
materials, processing of fruits and vegetables, catering, the production of national 
beverages, fur farming, construction, transport and other activities.  
Economic reforms were planned well ahead of the full independence Lithuania gained 
in August 1991. Already in the spring of 1990 Lithuania was acting as an independent 
economic unit, and the period of early privatization was very short. The privatization 
process in Lithuania was very different from the development in Estonia and Latvia. 
The concept of privatization in Lithuania was agreed upon and implemented already in 
1991 when strong egalitarian norms were still dominating the consciousness of leading 
politicians (see Čičinskas, 1994, p. 173). The first stage of privatization 1991-95 in 
Lithuania was much faster and more comprehensive, in fact one of the fastest in 
Eastern Europe. Vouchers and employee-ownership had a more important role, and 
direct sale and foreign investment had only a negligible role at this stage.  
The power of workers at the first stage of transition was based on workers’ councils 
and trade unions making demands about distribution of enterprise property and 
employee ownership. This tendency was reinforced by political processes because the 
elections to the Parliament (Seimas) strengthened the left-wing political forces. Unlike 
the other two Baltic countries, Lithuania did not have a large Russian-speaking 
minority. Therefore, the national question was not an important issue. Instead, 
economic policy has played an important role from the start, including possibilities to 
have real power over the decisions within enterprises, to remove old managers, 
connected with the Communist party, to put into effect the idea of social equality. 
The early privatizations were conducted by transfer of shares of leased enterprises to 
employees according to the Resolution of the Supreme Council from 16 October 16 
1990.3 The amount transferred was the sum of the leasing fees paid, plus delayed wage 
payment invested in production plus part of social funds. Almost 60 enterprises were 
included in this program.  According to the Temporary Law on private capital 
accumulation by employees in state-owned enterprises from 1990 (Valstybės žinios, 4 
December 1990, No. 35-849, abolished on 17 November 2004), state-owned 
enterprises could sell part of their shares to employees. Employees could pay a part of 
the price in vouchers. 50-60% of state enterprises have used this method at the start of 
                                                 
3  According to the Resolution, employees in enterprises with leasing agreements got the opportunity 
to acquire shares equal to the sum of leasing fees plus deferred wages invested in production plus 
part of the social fund. 60 enterprises covering 100 million Roubles of property were transferred 
(see Frydman et al., 1993, p. 263). 
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privatization until July 1991 when another program started (see Frydman et al., 1993, p. 
263).  
The first stage of privatization started when the Law on the Initial Privatization of 
State-Owned Property (LIPSP) was passed on 28 February 1991 at a time, when the 
result of the fight for independence was far from clear. The privatization plan was one 
of the elements in the fight for independence in Lithuania. It included privatization of 
enterprises formally owned and controlled by the central authorities in Moscow. The 
cornerstone of the fast privatization in Lithuania was the voucher scheme. Vouchers 
and cash quotas were given only to residents and had limited transferability (to 
relatives, later they could be used in exchange for outstanding housing loans). Besides, 
people could invest their vouchers or cash in return for shares in private investment 
funds. A number of investment funds were established on private initiative in the 
autumn of 1991, and the Law was amended in December 1991 to legalize their 
functions.4  
Under LIPSP, employees had the opportunity to buy a certain percentage of the shares 
in the first round of auctions at lower rates before most of the remaining shares were 
sold in public offerings in later rounds. The percentage of shares available for 
employees was increased from 10% in 1991 to 30% in 1992 and to 50% after the 
former Communist Party came into power in early 1993. Employees could use 
vouchers as well as cash to buy shares, usually at a price well below the market value. 
Moreover, because of only partial indexation of the price of the assets and the value of 
the vouchers, the advantage of employees increased over time (see Martinavicius, 1996, 
p. 280). This system made it possible for employees to obtain a considerable part of 
ownership even in large enterprises with high capital intensity. The 20% extra shares 
reserved for employees after 1993 initially did not have voting rights, but later it was 
made possible for the general meeting to convert these shares into ordinary voting 
shares. Hence, employee ownership was an important element in the privatization 
process, especially in large enterprises. Groups of managers usually had to make 
alliances with broader groups of employees if they wanted to take over the enterprise.5
ESOP Services International, which operated in the period of 1991-1997, played a 
significant role in facilitation of employee ownership in Lithuania (see Vilimavicius and 
Jukneviciene, 1996, pp. 323-348). 
                                                 
4  Investment funds were most active in 1992-93. Later most of the companies under their control 
experienced financial crisis or went bankrupt. The Law on investment companies was passed in 
July 1995 strengthening the regulation on auditing, reserves etc. and requiring the funds to get a 
license as a mutual fund or a holding company. Most of the investment funds did not fulfil the 
requirement at the deadline July 1997. By the end of 1998, there were only 22 investment 
companies left with a total of 228 million Litas worth of shares (Lithuanian Department of 
Statistics, publication 1999). 
5  Programs for sale of state owned enterprises to foreigners were introduced already in 1992, but 
until 1995 this program was used only in a limited number of cases. Little use was made of 
restitution of industrial enterprises to former owners.  
5 
Extended Country Report Lithuania 
 
The second stage of privatization was based on a new Law on Privatization of State-
Owned and Municipal Property from 4 July 1995. However, the previous law remained 
in force until 1 December 1997 in so far as privatization of state property included in 
privatization programmes prepared under the previous law were concerned. At this 
stage, residual shares and some of the very large companies including public utilities 
and infrastructure enterprises were to be sold. Use of vouchers was abolished, and only 
cash privatization was possible. The law vested significant powers in the so-called 
founders of enterprises, in most cases ministries or local municipalities.  
The third Law on Privatization which is still effective was adopted on 11 April 1997. 
The State Property Fund, controlled by Privatization Committee, was established. The 
following methods were proposed for privatization of state-owned shares of 
companies: auction (small enterprises), public subscription of shares (small and 
medium), tender (medium and large), lease with option to buy and direct negotiations. 
Leasing of property was used to simplify privatization, when privatization was 
unsuccessful or in combination with other methods (takeover of control). Only the 
largest state controlled companies could be privatized by tender and direct 
negotiations. The second stage of privatization was connected with significant 
difficulties, many of the entities were sold after several rounds of privatization, a 
number of privatized companies had accumulated debt. The public had a negative 
attitude to privatization since a number of privatized companies were granted exclusive 
conditions for operations.     
The third stage of privatization started in 2000, involving the remaining minor state 
shareholdings, real estate and property, and state-owned companies, which were 
excluded from privatization according to the Laws until the year 2000. These were 
shares of infrastructure companies and companies with dominant position in the 
market. One of the defined privatization methods or a combination of several of them 
could be used. In some cases the state retained a ‘golden’ share. 
During the second and third stage of privatization all privileges of employees were 
abolished. Employees could acquire the shares of enterprises in which they were 
employed only if the enterprise was sold at auction or by public subscription of shares. 
Enterprises sold at auction were often taken over by insiders, mostly by managers. 
During privatization in agriculture, former owners were entitled to restitution of land, 
woods and real estate. Collective farms were privatized according to the Law on Land 
Reform from 25 July 1991 and the Law on the Privatization of Property of Agricultural 
Enterprises from 20 July 1991, which provided employees with pre-emptive rights 
(Art. 10 (1) Law on Land Reform; Art. 3 (1); 4 (2) Law on the Privatization of Property 
of Agricultural Enterprises). In case of founding agricultural co-operatives employees 
could become co-owners and obtain participation rights (see Klimasaskas and 
Kasnauskiene, 1996, p. 331). 
 
b) Social Partners 
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Currently, the social partners are represented by three organizations of trade unions 
and two organizations of employers. Trade unions are organized around the Lithuanian 
Trade Union Confederation (Lietuvos profesinių sąjungų konfederacija), Lithuanian 
Trade Union ‘Solidarumas’ (Lietuvos profesinė sąjunga ‘Solidarumas’) and Lithuanian 
Labour  Federation (Lietuvos darbo federacija). Lithuanian Trade Union 
Confederation (headed by A. Sysas), is the largest and strongest one with over 120 000 
members, since May 2002 uniting at least 13 major existing trade unions from different 
industries and other sectors of economy (including public service, education, medical, 
agriculture sectors, chemical and metal industries, etc.). Lithuanian Trade Union 
‘Solidarumas’ was reorganized from Labour Union and is headed by A. Balsienė, 
currently member of Labour party and MP. The third one, Lithuanian Labour 
Federation (headed by K. Kuzmickas) was re-established in 1991 (first created in 
1919). Since 1996 LDF is a member of World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and 
from 2002 it belongs to European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  
During the post-soviet period several views have evolved concerning trade unions as 
organizations and their activities. Under Soviet rule, union membership was obligatory 
and the trade unions functioned as an instrument of the Communist party to control 
workers and managers. They were especially active in large, prosperous companies and 
organizations, while in small and weak enterprises their activities were negligible.  
Since the declaration of independence in 1991, trade unions rapidly ceased to exist in 
enterprises, where trade union leaders were weak, serving interests of management 
under Soviet rule.  
However, trade unions were retained in enterprises, where their leaders (old or newly 
elected) strongly supported the ideas of Sajudis and Lithuanian independence. In some 
of such companies trade union leaders took over management of the enterprises 
and/or participated actively in the privatization (a successful example is Kaunas 
Confectionery Factory which was sold to a foreign investor in 1992 after early 
privatization). In many other cases the trade union leaders lost to outside investments 
groups, which took over the ownership and control of a large number of 
manufacturing enterprises. 
The results of the survey on 405 Lithuanian companies done in 2000 (see Mygind, 
2002) show that membership of unions was in general very low and had slightly fallen 
over time. The membership level was significantly higher for enterprises with 
remaining state ownership. But even in them the role of trade unions diminished. 
Employee-owned enterprises had quite low union membership. There were no unions 
in new enterprises. 
In further development, negative attitudes have been diminishing and trade union 
membership has increased. Trade unions have started gaining power, as of 2004 their 
total number has reached 311 in different industries, including the public sector. 
Currently, the members support such major goals of the organizations as negotiations 
with employers and representatives of Government in signing collective work 
agreements, supervising implementation of the agreements’ clauses, fighting for 
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employee rights, against unsatisfactory labour relations and work conditions, against 
unfair wages and salaries. On the other hand, some of trade union members view the 
organizations mainly as mutual support funds the main function of which should be 
mutual support from regular cash contributions of all members of the organization. 
However, by the end of 2005, trade unions, organized within several largest and best 
performing companies of Lithuania have started demanding distribution of a part of 
profits to employees. The idea was strongly opposed by the employers.  
The general secretary of Lithuanian Trade Union Confederation Ms Janina Matuizienė 
has stated in an interview, that trade unions have a general aim of higher wages for 
employees and are relating it to the increase in company profitability. No particular 
actions concerning financial participation of employees are on the agenda of 
Confederation, but this issue can be supported if any industrial trade union makes a 
proposition.   
The employers are organized within Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists 
(Lietuvos pramonininkų asociacija), which is actively promoting interests of Lithuanian 
large business in Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas), as well as in Lithuanian Government, 
and Lithuanian Employers’ Confederation (Lietuvos darbdavių asociacija). Major 
problems raised by employers’ organizations concern high employment costs, 
including gradually increasing minimum wage level. These are viewed as major 
obstacles for competitiveness of Lithuanian businesses on international markets. 
According to the opinion of employers, in such a way Lithuanian companies are losing 
one of their key competitive advantages.  
The question of financial participation of employees was discussed neither by 
Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists nor by Lithuanian Employers’ 
Confederation. M. Busila, currently acting as director of Department of Economics 
and Finance of Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists, has declared in the 
interview6 that the confederation has taken no official position on this issue, but 
supports initiatives of individual enterprises. He mentioned that different methods of 
motivation of employees related to participation are used in some of the enterprises, 
but usually these are applied to managers. In his opinion, such practices are spread by 
the academic community and by branches of foreign firms. 
All three - trade union organizations, employers’ organizations and government 
representatives - participate in the tripartite Council. There was no public debate on 
financial participation of employees in the Council. European Companies can be 
established after the respective law was adopted by the Lithuanian parliament on 29 
April 2004, but no discussions on employee participation accompanied the adoption of 
the law. 
 
c) Current National Policy 
                                                 
6  Interviews with Mr. M. Busila and Ms J. Matuizienė were conducted by Ms Jone Sakalyte in March 
2005. 
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The programmes of coalition parties which came into power in 2004  including Social 
Democrats (Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija LSDP), New Union (Social Liberals) 
(Naujoji sajunga (Social liberalų partija)) and the newly established Labour party 
(Darbo partija DP) are aimed at increasing social guarantees, reducing poverty and 
unemployment.
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According to the Minister of Social Security and Labour, that time member of New 
Union (Social Liberals) Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, the policy of Lithuanian government is to 
reduce unemployment, provide legal and financial state guarantees to employees of 
bankrupt companies, increase current wages and pension payments and to reform the 
pension system. It must be seen against a background of increasing migration of 
working force to other EU states, including not only highly qualified professionals but 
also skilled workers in transportation, construction and retail sectors. 
Participation of employees has not been on the political agenda of the Parliament and 
the Government. There has been no discussion within the parties and in the 
Government so far concerning employee financial participation as well as participation 
in decision-making. 
 
 
2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
 
Economic research shows that Lithuanian enterprises use different financial 
participation schemes (employee shares, stock options and profit-sharing) in spite of 
lack of legal regulation in this field. Current legal regulation contains no special 
provisions and does not provide companies with incentives.  
 
a) Employee Share Ownership and its Legal Foundations 
One form of employee participation in Lithuania is employee share ownership, which 
has been obtained, in most cases, during privatization.  
 
(1) Privatization Issues 
Currently, privatization of the majority of enterprises in Lithuania is completed. 
However, privatization is still possible and the respective legal regulations are still 
effective. The most important regulations are the Law on Privatization of State 
Property and Property of Municipalities from 11 April 1997 as amended (hereinafter 
referred to as PL), Law on Securities Market from 17 December 2001 as amended and 
Law on the State Property Fund from 11 April 1997 as amended.  The PL allows for 
the following methods of privatization of state property: public share subscription (for 
large and medium scale enterprises), auctions (for small enterprises or spin-offs), 
tenders, direct negotiations and leasing with the option to buy (Art. 13 ff PL).  
Employee ownership in Lithuania could have emerged mainly before 1995. The 
current PL does not contain any significant preferential rights for employees in the 
privatization process. However, if shares are privatized by public tender, the employees 
can be offered up to 5% of the shares owned by the state at par value (Art. 16 (3) PL). 
This provision is not applicable to enterprises under state control in the sense of Art. 
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18 PL or to enterprises in which employees have already acquired shares of their 
enterprises under other laws (Art. 16 (3) PL). If shares are offered at a public tender or 
by direct negotiations, the final payment can be postponed for 5 years for employees 
(Art. 20 (3) PL).    
After the initial stage of privatization (1991-1995) was completed, the pre-emptive 
right of employees to buy assets or shares of the enterprises at nominal value (usually 
lower than the market value) was abolished. Employees, which have obtained company 
shares during initial (first) stage of privatization, have voting rights at the general 
meeting, right to call the general meeting, etc., and thus have a possibility to participate 
in the decision-making process on the same grounds as other company shareholders.  
 
(2) Company and Securities Law 
Although ownership of shares acquired by employees during privatization of 
enterprises has decreased dramatically, some employees still hold shares and thus have 
the rights attached to these securities. The most important legal regulations of 
company and securities law are the Law on Companies from 13 July 2000 as amended 
(hereinafter referred to as CL), the Law on Partnerships from 6 November 2003 as 
amended, Civil Code from 18 July 2000 as amended (hereinafter referred to as CC), the 
Law on Sole Proprietorship from 6 November 2003 as amended, the Law on State and 
Municipal Enterprises from 21 December 1994 as amended, the Law on Agricultural 
Companies from 16 April 1991 as amended and the Law on Securities’ Market from 16 
January 1996 in the edition from 17 December 2001 as amended (hereinafter referred 
as LSM). 
The quantitative distribution of business forms is relevant in this context. 
 
Table 1. Companies by business forms 
2003 2004  
Company Register
ed 
Operati
ng 
% of 
register
ed 
Register
ed 
Operati
ng 
% of 
register
ed 
State company 271 144 53 201 134 67 
Municipal comp. 139 81 58 111 74 67 
Limited 
partnership 470 265 56 431 197 46 
Private limited 
liability comp.7 46,888 21,146 45 47,902 24,833 52 
                                                 
7  The private limited liability company means ‘uždaroji akcinė bendrovė’ or ‘UAB’. 
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2003 2004  
Company Register
ed 
Operati
ng 
% of 
register
ed 
Register
ed 
Operati
ng 
% of 
register
ed 
Joint-stock 
comp.8 1,152 670 58 931 578 62 
Sole proprietor 83,017 31,860 38 76,090 27,898 37 
Special purpose 
joint-stock 
comp. 
21 16 76 1 - - 
Special purpose 
limited 
liabilitycomp. 
167 158 95 20 19 95 
Branch of 
foreign comp. 
since 2000-7-19 
39 - - 61 25 41 
Credit union 54 42 78 59 54 92 
Public enterprise 2,486 1,190 48 2,894 1,451 50 
Agricultural 
company 2,134 523 25 1,916 478 25 
Association 574 256 45 663 252 38 
Non-profit 
comp. 103 10 50 95 9 42 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics. 
Note: The table excludes budget organizations, political, religious, mutual, public 
organizations and associations, trade unions. Data on co-operatives and co-operative unions 
are given in a separate table. 
 
(a) Corporations 
According to the table, most popular business forms are corporations topped only by 
sole proprietorship. In corporations, employees have the same rights as other 
shareholders and, additionally, rights in connection with employee stock issued in the 
course of capital increase. According to Art. 15 (1.4) CL, shareholders have the pre-
emptive right in acquiring shares or convertible debentures issued by the company, 
except in cases when the general meeting decides to withdraw the pre-emptive right in 
                                                 
8  Joint-stock company means the public limited liability company (‘akcinė bendrovė’ or ‘AB’).  
 
 12 
2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
 
acquiring the company’s newly issued shares or convertible debentures for all the 
shareholders (Art. 20 (1.12) CL). 
Since most employees are minority shareholders, provisions on protection of minority 
shareholders are relevant. As a rule, the right to convene the general meeting shall be 
vested in the supervisory board, the management board or the manager of the 
company, and the shareholders who have at least 1/10 of all votes, unless the articles 
of association provide for a smaller number of votes (Art. 23 (1) CL). The agenda of 
the general meeting may be supplemented by the supervisory board, the management 
board or the manager or shareholders who hold shares corresponding to not less than 
1/10 of all votes attached to them, unless the articles of association provide for a 
smaller number (Art. 25 (3.1) CL). 
A decision of the general meeting shall be considered valid if more votes of the 
shareholders have been cast for it than against it, unless CL or the articles of the 
company provide for a larger majority (Art. 27 (8) CL). Decisions taken by the general 
meeting on core issues require a qualified majority vote of not less than 2/3 of all votes 
(Art. 28 (1) CL). The decision to withdraw the pre-emption right in acquiring the 
company’s newly issued shares or convertible debentures of a specific issue require a 
qualified majority vote of not less than 3/4 of all votes conferred by the shares of the 
shareholders present at the general meeting and entitled to decide on the issue (Art. 28 
(2) CL). The articles of association may provide for larger qualified majorities (Art. 28 
(3) CL). 
If a person, acting independently or in concert with other persons, acquires more than 
40% of votes at the general meeting, he is obliged either to transfer shares exceeding 
this threshold or to announce a tender offer to buy up the remaining voting shares of 
the issuer and the securities confirming the right to acquire voting shares within 30 
days (obligation to announce an obligatory tender offer) (Art. 19 (1) LSM). The price 
of a mandatory tender offer may not be lower than the highest price of the shares 
which the offeror acquired over one year before exceeding the threshold (Art. 19 (2.1) 
LSM. A person acting independently or in concert with other persons shall be devoid 
of all the votes at the general meeting of shareholders from the moment of exceeding 
the 40 per cent threshold (Art. 19 (3) LSM). The Securities Commission shall have the 
right to determine general cases of exceptions when announcement of a mandatory 
tender offer is not compulsory if the requirement to announce a tender offer would be 
unfair, inexpedient or contradictory to the market interests (Art. 19 (4) LSM).  
Along with the obligation to announce an obligatory tender offer (Art. 19 LSM), new 
provisions of the LSM from 17 December 2001 (effective since 1 April 2002) provide 
for a mandatory sale and purchase of shares: The shareholder of an issuer whose 
shares have been admitted to the official or the current list of a stock exchange 
registered in Lithuania, acting independently or in concert with other persons and 
having acquired shares representing not less than 95% of the total votes at the general 
meeting (referred to as majority shareholder) shall have the right to demand that all the 
remaining shareholders of the issuer sell the voting shares owned by them, and the 
13 
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shareholders shall be obligated to sell these shares (‘squeeze-out’) (Art. 191 (1) LSM). 
Minority shareholders have a corresponding sell-out right: Any shareholder of the 
issuer whose shares are admitted to the official or the current trading list of a stock 
exchange registered in Lithuania shall have the right to demand that the majority 
shareholder purchases the voting shares owned by him and the majority shareholder is 
obliged to buy up these shares (Art. 191 (15) LSM). 
In the course of capital increase, corporations (joint-stock companies as well as limited 
liability companies) can issue employee shares after all shares subscribed at the time of 
incorporation have been paid for (Art. 43 CL). CL does not provide for a maximum 
percentage of the capital employee shares may constitute. Employee shares are to be 
distributed among employees wishing to purchase them, with the exception of the 
management (Art. 43 (2) CL). A restriction period must be determined within which 
employee shares can be sold only to other employees which is not longer than three 
years (Art. 43 (3) CL). Within this period employee shares are not only shares of 
limited tradability, but also non-voting shares before the restriction period expires (Art. 
43 (3.3) CL), although employee shares are ordinary shares (Art. 43 (1.1) CL). Art. 43 
(5) CL stipulates that an employee must pay for subscribed employee shares before the 
expiry of the restriction period for the transfer of shares. The first payment should be 
made in cash within a short period; further instalments can be deducted from the salary 
upon application of the employee. The corporation is not allowed to put pressure on 
employees forcing them to purchase shares or to pay for shares by deduction from the 
salary. (Art. 43 (4) CL). After the expiry of the restriction period for the transfer of 
shares employee shares become ordinary shares and can be sold to third parties who 
are not employees of the company (Art. 43 (3) CL). 
Employees generally have the same rights as other shareholders. However, only 
employees are entitled to employee shares. Capital increase by issuing employee shares 
makes it possible for the corporation to increase capital and, at the same time, to retain 
control within the restriction period. It might be also advantageous for employees to 
purchase employee shares, especially in prosperous companies whose shares could be 
sold with profit after the expiry of the restriction period. Employees who obtained 
company shares during privatization have limited influence on decision-making since 
they are minority shareholders in most cases. Employees who obtained employee stock 
in the course of capital increase have no influence on decision-making since employee 
shares are non-voting shares during the restriction period. 
According to the Labour Code (in force since January 2003, hereinafter referred to as 
LC), employees may be represented and protected by trade unions or by work councils 
(Art. 19 (1) LC).9 The work councils should be an institution formed from 
                                                 
9  Where an enterprise, agency or organisation has no functioning trade union and if the staff 
meeting has not transferred the function of employee representation and protection to the trade 
union of the appropriate sector of economic activity, the employees shall be represented by the 
work council elected by secret ballot at the general meeting of the staff (Art. 19 (1); 21 (2) LC).  
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representatives of all employees. A trade union, however, can be established by a small 
part of all employees in an enterprise. Nevertheless, the priority to negotiate with the 
employer has been vested in trade unions (see Art. 19 (1); 21 (2); 60 (4) LC). The trade 
unions are active only in a small number of private enterprises, but the special law on 
work councils (Art. 21 (1) LC) has not been adopted yet, so that no work councils 
could be established in practice. As a result, the conditions favour the creation of trade 
unions and expansion of their activities.  
As far as employees’ representation in European Companies (Law on European 
Companies from 29 April 2004, in force since 8 October 2004) is concerned, on 12 
May 2005 the Seimas implemented the Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 
2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the 
involvement of employees by adopting the Law on the Involvement of Employees in 
Decision-Making in European Companies of 28 May 2005. EU Directive 94/45/EC 
on the establishment of a European Works Council (EWC) or a procedure in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the 
purposes of informing and consulting employees was implemented in Lithuania by the 
Law on European Works Councils from 19 February 2004 regulating the election of 
members of special negotiating bodies and European works councils.  
 
(b) Co-operatives 
The legal status of co-operative societies is regulated by the Law on Co-operative 
Societies from 28 May 2002 as amended (hereinafter referred to as LCS) and the Civil 
Code from 18 July 2000 as amended (hereinafter referred to as CC). A co-operative 
society (co-operative) (‘kooperatinė bendrovė’ or ‘kooperatyvas’) is defined as an enterprise 
established by at least five legal entities and/or natural persons for the purpose of 
meeting economic, social or cultural needs of its members. The members make 
contributions to the capital, share risks and profits according to the turnover of 
members’ goods or services within the co-operative society and take an active part in 
the management of the co-operative (Art. 2 (2) LCS).  
A co-operative society is a legal entity with limited liability (Art. 3 (1) LCS). The co-
operative society is liable for its obligations only to the extent of its assets, whereas a 
co-operative’s member shall be liable for the obligations of the co-operative society to 
the extent of member’s contribution subject to payment for member’s share (Art. 3 (2) 
LCS).  
Besides the part of profit paid out to the members in proportion to the volume of 
turnover according to the procedure established by the articles of association, up to 
10% of the profit shall be paid out as dividends (Art. 14 (4) LCS). Theoretically, a co-
operative is an appropriate business form for employee-owned enterprises. An 
advantage of this business form is that (atypically for co-operative societies) liability 
can be limited and profit can be distributed. Legislation does not even provide for a 
minimum share capital of a co-operative society. Payments to the capital reserve are 
mandatory for all co-operative societies if the reserve capital makes up at least 1/10 of 
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the own funds value, and the amount of mandatory deductions into the reserve fund 
makes up at least 5 per cent of the net profit (Art. 12 (3) LCS). 
Inadvantageous may be the new provision that – besides the part of profit paid out to 
the members in proportion to the volume of turnover according to the procedure 
established by the articles of association - only up to 10% of the dividends shall be 
appropriated for the payment of dividends (Art. 14 (4) LCS) which seems too little.  
Each member of a co-operative society has one vote in the general meeting (members’ 
meeting, in co-operatives with more than 100 members - meeting of representatives of 
the co-operative society members) regardless of the amount of member’s share (Art. 
11 (1.2) LCS). Regulation on delimitation of power between the general meeting and 
the board or (in co-operatives with not more than 50 members) head of the 
administration of a co-operative society (Art. 15-18 LCS) is sufficiently detailed.  
 
(c) Partnerships 
In spite of the possibility to establish partnerships, especially after Law on Partnerships 
was adopted on 6 November 2003, this business form is not widespread. In particular, 
attorneys at law and notaries prefer this form. By other businesses, incorporation is 
preferred since partnership is advantageous first of all for the mentioned free-lance 
professionals. The basic provisions on partnerships are Art. 6.969-6.982 CC and the 
Law on Partnerships from 6 November 2003, in effect as of 1 January 2004 
(hereinafter referred to as PL). PL, in contrast, does not provide for a definition of 
partnership per se but of general partnership (‘tikroji ūkinė bendrija’/acronym: TŪB, 
hereinafter referred to as GP) and limited partnership (‘komanditinė ūkinė 
bendrija’/acronym: KŪB, hereinafter referred to as LP) – a differentiation completely 
lacking in the provisions of Art. 6.969 ff CC. Partnership in the sense of PL and 
discussed here is an enterprise, what means that the activities of the partnership are 
aimed at producing profit, while an agreement on joint activities (partnership) in 
accordance with Art. 6.969 CC is not conclusively related to the seeking of profit, but 
can also serve as the basis for establishment of partnerships. Thus, the provisions of 
Art. 6.969-6.982 CC can be applied only as far as PL does not contain special rules.  
The general partnership is an enterprise all of whose (minimum two, maximum 20) 
members are general partners, while the limited partnership is an enterprise whose 
(minimum 3, maximum 20) members are general partners (at least two) and limited 
partners (at least one) (Art. 2 (1), (2); Art. 7 (4) PL). The partnership is a private legal 
entity of unlimited civil liability which acquires civil rights, assumes civil obligations 
and implements the above through the general partners (Art. 2 (4), (5) PL). 
The founders of the partnership (persons who have concluded the partnership 
agreement, general partners) may be both natural persons and legal entities (Art. 3 (2) 
PL). The number of founders (as the number of partnership members) is restricted to 
20 (Art. 3 (3) PL). The following persons cannot be founders or general partners of the 
partnership: general partners of other partnerships, owners of individual enterprises, 
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the state, municipalities, state-owned enterprises, municipal enterprises, budgetary 
institutions, partnerships, individual enterprises, European Economic Interest 
Groupings (Art. 3 (4); 7 (5), (6) PL). Both general partner and limited partner have to 
make a contribution (or – in the case of a general partner - to commit himself to make 
a contribution) into the partnership in the manner prescribed by PL and the 
partnership agreement or limited partner’s agreement they concluded (Art. 7 (1), (2) 
PL). The partners can contribute not only money, but also other property units, 
knowledge, skills, reputation and business relations (Art. 6.970 (1) CC; Art. 10 (2) PL).  
If the assets of the partnership prove insufficient to satisfy its obligations, the general 
partners of the partnership shall be jointly and severally liable for the partnership 
obligations with all their property. In contrast to PL, CC provides for a differentiation 
of liability for joint obligations in the partnership in dependence of the sphere of 
activities (commercial – not commercial): If the partnership agreement concerns 
commercial activities, all partners have joint and several liability for joint obligations 
(Art. 6.975 (2), (3) CC). If the partnership agreement concerns other than commercial 
activities, each partner is liable for joint contractual obligations with all his property in 
proportion to his part of such obligations; under joint non-contractual obligations the 
partners shall be jointly and severally liable  (Art. 6.975 (1), (2) CC).   
At the end of the financial year the profits shall be distributed on the decision (by 
common consent) of all general partners (Art. 13 (1), 8 (2.1) PL). The share of profits 
allocated to each member of the partnership must be paid out within three months 
from the day of the decision on the distribution of profits (Art. 13 (4) PL). The share 
of profits of the general partnership due to the general partners shall be distributed to 
each general partner in proportion to the amount of his contribution, unless otherwise 
established in the partnership agreement (Art. 13 (2), 8 (2.6) PL). The agreement to 
exclude any of the partners from the distribution of profits shall be null and void (Art. 
6.976 (2) CC). 
Advantageous for employees seems to be the concept of limited partnership since it 
offers limited liability and distribution of profit (even before general partners have to 
receive their share of profit). This advantage, however, is curtailed by the complete 
exclusion of limited partners from decision-making. Among the members of a 
partnership, only the general partner enjoys the right to take part in the settling of 
partnership affairs and in the decision-making (Art. 8 (2.1) PL). The general partner is 
also entitled to act on behalf of the partnership unless otherwise established in the 
partnership agreement, to propose amendments to the partnership agreement, to be 
granted access to the documents of the partnership (Art. 8 (2.2-2.4) PL). In contrast to 
that, as for the limited partner, PL does not provide for any right to take part in the 
management of the partnership or in decision-making. However, the limited partner 
can be granted such a right by other laws or by the limited partner’s agreement (see 
Art. 9 (1.7) PL). Each partner shall be entitled to have access to the documents 
concerning the management of the joint affairs, notwithstanding whether or not he has 
the right to manage the joint affairs (Art. 6.973 CC). Consequently, the limited partner 
is entitled to be granted access to the partnership agreement and amendments thereto, 
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to the documents of the limited partnership’s general affairs management and its 
financial statements, to all information that must be presented under CC to the 
creditors of the limited partnership (Art. 9 (1.4-1.6) PL).  
 
b) Profit-Sharing 
There are no specific regulations concerning profit-sharing with employees. Since 
companies have to pay income taxes on dividends, this is viewed as an expensive way 
of profit distribution. Priority is given to share buy-back schemes. Employee monetary 
incentive schemes used in companies include payments of premiums, bonuses, in some 
cases related to company turnover and profits. Bonuses have tax advantages, since they 
are not double taxed as dividends are (firstly at corporate profit tax rate, secondly at 
income tax rate), but taxed only by income tax for individuals (33%10). 
 
c) Taxation Issues 
As far as the taxation of salary is concerned, the company pays the social security tax 
amounting to 31% of the employee’s gross wage (1% for labour accidents’ insurance, 
3% for medical insurance, 22.5% for pension insurance; 3% for sickness and maternity 
or paternity insurance; and 1.5% for unemployment insurance), and employees pay the 
personal income tax amounting to 33% (Art. 2 (14), (16.1); Art. 6 (3) Law on Personal 
Income Tax from 2 July 2002 as amended) and the social security tax amounting to 3% 
as a withholding tax (2.5% for pension insurance and 0.5% for sickness and maternity 
or paternity insurance) payable to the State Social Security Fund.  
Individuals carrying out individual activities can choose if they pay 33% income tax 
and are allowed to make deductions or 15% income tax without the possibility of 
deductions (Art. 6 (2.8) Law on Personal Income Tax).  
On dividends, the company pays profit tax amounting to 15% (Art. 2 (15), 5 (1.3) Law 
on Profit Tax), small enterprises 13% (Art. 2 (15), 5 (2) Law on Profit Tax), and 
employees generally pay personal income tax amounting to 15% (Art. 2 (14), 12, 16 (1), 
6 (2.1) Law on Personal Income Tax). Income from the sale of securities by individuals 
is taxed only in exceptional cases. Profit from sale of company shares is not taxed if the 
owner has acquired them before 1 January 1999, and if he has acquired them after 1 
January 1999 and has owned less than 10% of the shares for more than 3 years 
preceding the sale (see Art. 17 (1.22), (1.23) Law on Personal Income Tax).  
After the start of pension reform (Law on Pension Funds from 3 June 1999 No. VIII-
1212 (Žin., 1999, No. 55-1765), amended on 4 July 2003, change of the title to Law on 
Supplementary Voluntary Pension Accumulation, Žin., 2003, No.75-3473) a possibility 
of accumulation of company funds for the employee pension plans emerged. Since 
2005 private pension funds, majority of which established by commercial banks,
                                                 
10  On 1 July 2006 income tax was reduced to 27% and a further reduction to 24% is expected in 
2008. 
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started operations and active marketing of accumulation of company funds in favour 
of employees. Companies are provided with tax incentives on payments to private 
pension funds, for the benefit of employees (these contributions are deducted from 
revenue in accordance with Art. 26 (1) Law on Profit Tax). The same tax incentives are 
provided for companies’ life insurance payments for the benefit of employees to 
private insurance companies (when life insurance period exceeds 10 years) (Art. 26 (2) 
Law on Profit Tax). The two latter schemes are marketed as aimed at increase of 
employee motivation. 
   
 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
Employee ownership and profit-sharing emerged during privatization and partly in 
new enterprises. Since data concerning employee participation is scarce, current 
situation can be characterized by indirect indicators and research regarding 
privatization processes. 
 
a) Small Privatization 
Employees of small companies enjoyed no preferential treatment as compared to 
employees of large companies. Employees of middle-sized and large enterprises 
acquired shares of privatized entities often on preferential terms, but small enterprises 
were mostly privatized by the management. The LIPSP program did not formally 
include special preferences for employees in small privatization, because small 
enterprises were mostly sold at public auctions, where vouchers and cash quotas could 
be used. However, because of inside information and access to resources for purchase 
in the form of vouchers, insiders also had a relatively strong position in the 
privatization of small firms. There were special conditions to secure the continuation 
of the current activity for at least three years, and lay-offs of employees were restricted 
to maximum 30% in the same period. Although small privatization included around 
half of the 6,000 enterprises to be privatized in the LIPSP program, the small enter-
prises only covered a small percentage of the total assets and the total number of 
employees. By August 1992, 1,300 small enterprises were privatized, by October 1994 
the number was 2,498, and in July 1995 it was 2,727 according to the statistics of the 
Ministry of Economics. 
 
b) Large Privatization 
During the first stage of privatization 5,714 objects were privatized, including 2,928 
large and medium companies by public subscription of shares, and 12 companies by 
tender. According to the State Property Fund, 1991-1995, 81% of state-owned assets 
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put out for privatization were privatized. As a result of fast privatization, already in 
1996 private sector contributed 68% to the GDP. At the first stage of privatization, a 
wide layer of owners (estimated at approximately 1 million. people in 1995) emerged 
who owned shares of companies as employees, individual outside shareholders or 
through investment funds. Different starting positions of separate groups of 
participants of privatization caused specific ownership structure after the initial 
privatization. Employees of privatized companies (2/3 of them managers) acquired 
7.4% of statutory capital of all privatized companies on preferential terms. For deposit 
of vouchers, over 2.6 million investment accounts were opened in banks, which 
accumulated vouchers with the value over 10.2 billion Litas. 
At the end of 1992, employees received a relatively small part of total privatized equity 
and 67% of enterprises had no employee ownership. This figure does not include the 
earliest insider-takeovers of shares, which were formally outside the LIPSP-program. 
In just two years there was an astonishing change. By 1994, fewer than 5% of the 
privatized firms in the LIPSP program had no employee ownership and the percentage 
of enterprises where the majority of privatized assets were taken over by employees 
increased from 3% in 1991-1992, to 65% in 1993, and to 92% in 1994-1995 according 
to the statistics of the Privatization Department at the Ministry of Economics. This 
development reflects the massive increase in support for employee take-overs. 
However, in most of the enterprises the state still kept some assets (48% of the 
statutory capital of all privatized entities). 
Table 2. Employee-owned share of privatized capital – LIPSP, million Litas 
 
% owned by insiders 
 
0% 
 
1-10% 
 
11-30% 
 
31-50% 
 
51-100% 
 
total 
 
Sept. 1 1991 
April 7 1992 
 
firms 
capital 
 
510 
338 
 
100 
100 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
510 
338 
 
100 
100 
 
April 7 1992 
Febr. 1 1993 
 
firms 
capital 
 
410 
433 
 
43 
46 
 
47 
96 
 
5 
10 
 
172 
191 
 
18 
20 
 
240 
162 
 
25 
17 
 
76 
60 
 
8 
6 
 
945 
942 
 
100 
100 
 
Febr. 1 1993 
July. 1 1995 
 
firms 
capital 
 
29 
13 
 
2 
1 
 
39 
83 
 
3 
6 
 
66 
174 
 
5 
13 
 
141 
230 
 
10 
17 
 
1,190 
851 
 
81 
63 
 
1,465 
1,351 
 
100 
100 
 
Sept. 1 1991 
July 1. 1995 
 
firms 
capital 
c./firm 
 
949 
785 
1.21 
 
33 
30 
 
 
86 
179 
2.08
 
3 
7 
 
238 
365 
1.53
 
8 
14 
 
381 
391 
1.03
 
13 
15 
 
1,266 
912 
0.72 
 
43 
35 
 
2,920 
2,632 
0.90 
 
100 
100 
Source: Based on data from Department of Privatization, Ministry of Economy, October 
1995. 
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Note: The table is based on privatized capital - more than 50% might not imply majority 
employee ownership because the state has retained a proportion of the shares. Further, it must 
be noted that only registered employee-owned capital in the LIPSP program is included. This 
does not include certain stocks, which also could be controlled by insiders e.g. through 
investment funds, or stocks bought before LIPSP or after the first offering. 
By 1995, out of the total amount of vouchers 7% was unused, 64% had been used for 
payment of shares in enterprises, 19% for privatization of apartments and 9% for land 
and agricultural entities.  
By the end of the first stage, privatization did not bring cash inflows to state budget. 
Government also felt shortage of funds due to restitution of land and real estate, 
banking crisis of 1995, urgent need of real investments, which forced Government to 
change privatization policy. At the new stage of privatization, state-owned and 
municipal property could be sold for cash at market price. Both local and foreign 
investors as well as legal entities and natural persons obtained equal rights. Though 
preferential rights of employees were abolished, managers and their family members 
gained even more influence. During 1996-1997 319 entities were privatized with 84.2 
million Litas income to Privatization Fund. Foreign investors accounted for 79% of all 
privatization proceeds. 
In 1997, it became obvious that the privatization law did not offer the necessary tools 
for the second phase of the privatization process. As the new version of the 
Privatization law was adopted in December 1997, the number of available privatization 
methods was increased.  
Until 1997 the ownership structure significantly differed from that prevailing in other 
Eastern and Central European companies, due to extremely low foreign ownership, 
very high ownership by insiders (management and employees), high state ownership 
and very low ownership by investors (banks, investment funds, etc.). Since many of the 
shareholders were not satisfied with the volume of shareholdings, the secondary 
market of company shares and assets emerged. The value of employees’ shares was 
very low due to the underdeveloped stock exchange, no mechanism of protection of 
minority shareholders existed, legal regulation favoured large shareholders. Therefore, 
majority of employees sold their shares, usually at a loss and used the proceeds from 
sale for consumption.  
Data on privatization for the second and third stages show the increase of the number 
of privatized entities until 2000, and further reduction of employee ownership. During 
the period shares of only two companies were sold to employees. All other methods 
favoured foreign investors, strong local investment groups and the management.  
By 2005, privatization was nearly complete. Major assets still in government control 
included the Lithuanian electric power company, Lietuvos Energija, the National 
Airline, Lietuvos Avialinijos, and the railway company, Lietuvos Gelezinkeliai.  
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c) Survey Evidence and Case Studies 
The development of ownership structure can be analysed on the basis of different 
surveys on ownership structures done by Mygind in cooperation with the Lithuanian 
Statistical department (see Jones and Mygind, 1999; Mygind, 1996; Mygind, 1997; 
Mygind, 2000; Mygind, 2002). The first ownership survey, undertaken in July 1994, 
elicited responses from 356 quite large industrial enterprises. It confirms, to some 
extent, the rapid extension of ownership of insiders (mangers and other employees). By 
July 1994 only 8% of these enterprises had no insider ownership and most of these 25 
enterprises were still state-owned. 25% of the enterprises had 31-50% insider 
ownership, and 18% of the enterprises had majority insider ownership. Most of these 
enterprises had more shares owned by the employees than by managers. In July 1994 
in only 13% of cases with some insider ownership did managers own more equity than 
the remaining employees. 15% of the industrial firms had insider majority with 
employee dominance and only 3% had insider majority with manager dominance in 
July 1994. The Lithuanian industry sample consists of rather large enterprises with an 
average employment of 600 employees. Manager dominated insider majority has the 
largest average, but the data do not reveal striking differences in the size structure.  
Another survey on construction and trade was undertaken in July 1995, and the results 
show many of the same tendencies as in industry. Only 6% of the 148 enterprises had 
no employee ownership in July 1995, and 40% had majority insider ownership. 26% 
had management dominance and 14% employee dominance. However, this difference 
from the tendency in industry partly reflects the fact that the numbers for construction 
and trade are from July 1995, leaving one more year for the change of ownership from 
employees to managers. There are no striking tendencies in the variation of ownership 
when comparing enterprises of different sizes except for a weak tendency for higher 
management dominance in smaller companies.   
Looking at the capital structure for the data from the early years the most striking 
difference between the different owner groups in industrial enterprises is the fact that 
insider-owned and especially employee-owned enterprises have a relatively low 
nominal capital or equity per employee. State-owned, foreign-owned and no majority 
companies have relatively high capital intensity. Turning to construction and trade 
there was another pattern with insider-owned companies around the average of 
nominal capital per employee. Only management dominated enterprises have a slightly 
lower nominal capital per employee. Looking at the total assets per employee, however, 
insider-owned companies in all the analyzed sectors followed to a high degree the 
pattern of the average enterprise. This might indicate that in industry insiders and 
especially managers had been able to get a majority of the shares at a relatively low 
price. It fits well to the fact, that insiders had the first bid at the initial price in the 
LIPSP privatization.  
More updated ownership information for Lithuania is based on a manager-survey 
performed in the spring of 2000. It provides information on ownership at the time of 
privatization or start as a new firm, and for 1993, 1996, 1999 and spring 2000 for 405 
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respondents.11 This data gives information both of the ownership at the early period of 
privatization/start up and the following dynamics in ownership. 
In 1993 around 50% of the employees were owners in the whole sample of 404 
responding enterprises. However, the proportion of owners fell to around 1/3 in 1999, 
see Table 3. Not surprising, the proportion of employee owners were highest in 
employee-owned enterprises, but also here the proportion of owners fell from 76% 
from 1993 to 66% in 1999. The high percentage of owners among the employees 
suggests that the Lithuanian voucher system helped employees as a group to overcome 
the problem of lack of capital. There was also a tendency for the percentage of non-
owners to be higher in large enterprises than in smaller. 
 
Table 3.  Distribution of Ownership on Employees  (Mygind 2002) 
                  \ ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  for-
eign  
do-
mes-
tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee 
no 
ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
% non-owning 
employees 
1993 
   N 
61 
(89) 
76 
(14) 
54 
(47) 
65 
(44) 
24 
(45) 
37   
(55) 
51 
(294)
38 
(96) 
71 
(44) 
% non-owning 
employees 
1996 
   N 
69 
(69) 
94 
(27) 
63 
(97) 
64 
(89) 
43 
(42) 
39   
(74) 
61 
(398)
46 
(238) 
94 
(87) 
% non-owning 
employees 
1999 
   N 
74 
(63) 
93 
(34) 
67 
(98) 
66 
(96) 
34 
(33) 
58   
(80) 
66 
(404)
54 
(254) 
93 
(87) 
rather equal 
 
 
(Pct) 
6   7   20 14  9  5    61 34 21 
                                                 
11  The sample is a stratified random sample and is derived from a database covering 7,546 enterprises 
that provided financial data for 1997. In constructing our sample we applied the following criteria: 
eliminate firms that were fully state owned enterprises or were very small (in fact, employed fewer 
than 20 employees); include all (large) enterprises with more than 100 employees and one third of 
the smaller firms (employing 20-100). Applying these criteria resulted in 1,372 enterprises being 
identified. Attempts were made to contact all these enterprises, though many were found to have 
closed and others refused to respond. The 405 responses make up around 30% of the initial group. 
Some of the enterprises still had state majority in 2000, therefore only a smaller number is reported 
in some of the tables below. Furthermore, we have a large data set of 6-7,000 enterprises for 1996 
and 1997 with some ownership information. We have financial information for all these 
enterprises collected by the Statistical Department of Lithuania. The data do not distinguish 
between private new-started and privatized enterprises. However, the data covers mainly 
enterprises with 20 or more employees and we can assume that most of the large private 
enterprises are privatized. 
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                  \ ownership 
average per enterprise 
state  for-
eign  
do-
mes-
tic  
mana-
ger  
em-
ployee 
no 
ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
(23) (54) (27) (16) (28) (7) (20) (14) (42) 
unequal (more than 1:2) 
                            (Pct) 
8   
(31) 
2   
(15) 
21   
(28) 
16  
(19) 
12   
(36) 
33     
(43) 
92  
(30) 
72   
(30) 
14  
(28) 
very unequal (> 1:10) 
                            (Pct) 
12   
(46) 
4   
(31) 
35 
(45) 
55 
(65) 
12   
(36) 
38   
(50) 
156 
(50) 
132 
(56) 
15   
(30) 
N  26 13 74 85 33 76 309 238 50 
 
Table 4. Ownergroups and minority ownership by other groups 1993-99 
(Mygind 2002) 
  
1993 \majority 
ownership  
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mesti
c 
ma-
nager
em-
ploy-
ee 
no 
ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 94 0.7 6 3 6 21 44 42 1 
foreign 0.0 78 3 2 0 5 5 1 27 
domestic external owner 0.8 5.3 73 4 6 23 17 21 10 
managers 0.5 16 8 75 16 23 15 12 52 
other employees 4.7 0.1 10 16 72 28 19 24 10 
Total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100 
 
1996 \majority 
ownership  
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mesti
c 
ma-
na-ger
em-
ploy-
ee 
no 
ma-
jority 
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 91 0.7 5 4 4 17 22 13 1 
foreign 0.3 78 4 1 0 3 7 2 25 
domestic external owner 2.3 11 73 6 4 23 26 34 20 
managers 1.2 9 8 74 21 28 25 24 45 
other employees 5.2 1 10 15 71 29 20 27 9 
Total   100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100 
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1999\ majority 
ownership  
average % owned by  
state fo-
reign 
do-
mesti
c 
ma-
nager
em-
ploy-
ee 
no 
ma-
jority
total priva-
tized 
new 
state/municipal 93 1 4 3 2 15 19 9 1 
foreign 1 81 3 2 0 6 9 5 26 
domestic external owner 1 11 78 7 5 28 28 38 20 
managers 1 6 7 75 20 26 27 26 43 
other employees 4 1 8 13 73 25 17 22 10 
Total 
 
  100   100   100   100  100  100   100 100 100 
All companies have the same weight when measuring the average. 
 
Table 4 shows that minority employee ownership is quite frequent in all types of 
enterprises. This is not surprising since the first wave of large privatization in Lithuania 
resulted in widespread employee ownership in a high number of enterprises. For a long 
period the state also kept a share in most enterprises except foreign-owned. Managers 
have quite high minority shares especially in employee-owned enterprises and 
employees have high shares in manager-owned enterprises. Minority ownership by 
employees is less frequent in foreign-owned enterprises and most frequent in 
management-owned and non-majority enterprises. Insiders taken together have on 
average a majority of the ownership in no-majority enterprises. The lowest percentage 
of non-owning employees is found in enterprises with employee majority ownership. 
However, the number of non-owning employees is increasing over the period, and the 
share totally owned by other employees is also falling from 1993 to 1999. Looking at 
the distribution among the employee owners in Table 3, it is most unequal in 
enterprises with manager majority. New enterprises have a quite high degree of equality 
among the employee owners. From all of these cases, there was more than one shift in 
ownership only in 15 cases. Since this is too few to identify specific tendencies, 
ownership dynamics are shown in a matrix that covers only the first and the last 
recorded private ownership type. The results in Table 5 show employee and former 
employee-owned enterprises being the least stable. The average concentration rate on 
the largest single owner increases in Lithuania from 41.6% to 47.5% during the period 
of observation. The most frequent change is clearly from employee to managerial 
ownership, followed by the change from employee and former employee ownership 
directly to external domestic ownership. All these changes are accompanied by steep 
changes in concentration. Except for one case, there are no shifts from outside 
ownership to employee ownership.  
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Table 5.  Lithuania ownership transition matrix:  privatization/start to 2000           
          
\2000 
priv/start 
foreign domes
tic
manager employe
e
former  
employee 
total change
foreign 31 3 2 0 0 36 13.9%
domestic 2 70 6 1 3 82 14.6%
manager 3 5 69 6 0 83 16.9%
employee 6 10 33 41 3 93 55.9%
former 
employee  
1 11 4 2 18 36 50.0%
total 43 99 114 50 24 330 
(Jones and Mygind, 2005) 
Although the tendency since privatization has been a sharp fall in the incidence of 
employee participation in ownership there are also some new trends going in the 
opposite direction. We have found several recent cases where employees have got 
shares in companies as part of employee incentive schemes. In the case of limited 
liability company Bitė GSM, second largest mobile service provider in Lithuania, every 
company employee was granted a possibility to become stockholder of joint-stock 
company TDC, the sole owner of Bitė GSM. Employees were offered TDC stock 
options to purchase company shares at a price of 10.49 Euro (36.2 Litas) in 5 years. 
The offered price was three times lower than the traded price at the moment of the 
offer. Each employee received an option to purchase up to 90 shares (see Dubauskas, 
2005). Another case is of the Baltic Beverage Holding which included possibilities for 
employees to acquire shares of the company in the employee loyalty programme (see 
Aleknienė, 2003). In several cases employees (especially management) of branches of 
foreign companies were offered to buy shares of the company at a discount.12 The 
offers are made at the end of the year as a form of remuneration of employees. Such 
opportunities are attractive when company shares are traded at stock exchanges and 
appreciation of share prices is expected. 
We have investigated a specific case of limited liability company Information 
Technologies (Informacinės technologijos). In an interview13 the company manager 
provided information about the use of employee stock options. The major reason for 
application of this form of employee financial participation was to ensure company 
growth and to improve performance. Since human capital, knowledge and new ideas 
are major factor of company development, possibility to purchase company shares is 
viewed as a way to attract and retain especially skilled and talented employees. Such a 
possibility was granted to company CEO, heads of departments, project managers, 
                                                 
12  Source: Interviews with company branch management conducted in April 2005. 
13  The interview was conducted by Ms V. Urmonaitė in April 2005. 
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chief financial officer and others. These employees are offered to buy a limited number 
of shares at the end of each year at a price equal to 25-33% of annual salary. For this 
purpose the company increases statutory capital by new share emission annually. New 
employees are granted such rights after a few years of work in the company. The 
scheme allows to maintain stable ownership structure as shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6. Ownership structure of Information Technologies 2000 – 2003  
Company 
management
Company 
employees
Foreign 
investors Other investors
2003 45% 24% 28% 5%
2002 45,45 22,20% 28,40% 4,00%
2001 45,60% 21,60% 28,65 4,20%
2000 46% 22% 27% 5%
 
Thus, we can distinguish several methods of development of employee stock 
ownership: through sale of company shares at a discount, through stock options, and 
by remuneration of employees with company shares. Such employee financial 
participation schemes are being developed to a greater extent in specific types of 
companies, namely in large companies, in foreign-owned companies, in joint-stock 
companies listed on the stock exchange, and in new knowledge based companies.  
 
d) Privatization in Agriculture 
Agricultural reform, according to which agricultural workers were granted small plots 
of land (of 3 hectares each), formed a layer of small farms. Though concentration 
processes have started in agriculture, small (especially, dairy) farms are still prevailing.   
Since the start of agricultural reform until January 2005, 745.5 thousand application for 
restitution of property rights on 4.2 million. ha of agricultural land have been 
submitted. Property rights were granted to 688 thousand citizens (90.9% of 
applications) for a total of 3.73 million. ha of land. In cases where restitution of 
property was not permissible citizens were compensated by other defined state 
property (Resolution No. 1130 of the Government as of 12 July 2002 ‘Concerning 
Compensation to Citizens with State-Owned Securities (Shares) for the Remaining 
Real Estate Redeemed by the State’). 
Due to the mentioned specific features of agricultural reform, employee ownership is 
not wide-spread, small family farms are prevailing. There are approximately 400 
registered agricultural co-operatives in 2003, however, only a part of them are 
operating.  
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e) Co-operatives 
Various types of co-operatives, including consumers, agricultural, production, workers, 
and credit co-operatives exist presently. The number of operating co-operatives is two 
times lower than the total number. The majority of co-operative societies are small 
employing up to 9 persons. The number of workers’ co-operatives is very small. 
Table 7. Co-operatives at the beginning of year 
2003 2004  
Co-operatives  Registere
d 
Operatin
g 
% of 
registered
Registere
d 
Operatin
g 
% of 
registered
Co-operative 
limited liability 
company 
10 3 30 4 2 50 
Co-operative 
limited liability 
company 
founded by 
limited liability 
company  
5 4 80 2 2 100 
Co-operative 
enterprise 9 1 11 4 - - 
Co-operative 
company 509 236 46 531 258 49 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics. 
 
f) Profit-Sharing 
Since emigration rates of skilled employees are increasing, the competition between 
domestic companies, including branches of foreign companies, on human resources, is 
developing, and different motivation schemes are introduced. Genuine profit-sharing is 
quite rare; share repurchases and monetary incentive schemes prevail. Several types of 
monetary incentive schemes have been developed for managers and other employees, 
which can be attributed to direct profit-sharing. For company CEOs, premiums and 
bonuses depend upon annual turnover, and, in some cases, on profit.14 Such schemes 
are popular in branches of foreign companies as well as in domestic large- and middle-
sized companies. For employees, premiums and bonuses are related to annual or 
quarterly profit only if their input into the profit can be measured. Thus, in fact forms 
of gain sharing are used. Fringe benefits paid from earned profit or included directly 
                                                 
14  Combination of wages and salaries with profitability was not very popular (especially, before 
company income tax reduction to 15% in 2003), since finance management in majority of 
companies is oriented towards minimization of taxes paid. 
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into costs, as free of charge mobile calls, leasing of automobiles, low interest/ free 
loans,
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free visits to sport centres, payment for different level studies have been expanding 
rapidly (see Meškauskaitė, 2005). Investment in private pension funds and accumulated 
life insurance as a means of motivation for employees have been extensively used first 
by branches of foreign companies and then also by domestic IT, advertising, 
telephone, construction, furniture and textile companies since 2004 (see Dževeckytė, 
2005; Dubauskas, 2005). 
 
 
4. Empirical Evidence of Economic and Social Effects 
 
The data for the analysis of the effect of employee ownership on performance can be 
taken from the earlier mentioned ownership surveys combined with financial data from 
the enterprises. We have data for the 90ies, especially the first half, when employee 
ownership was widespread. The high frequency of employee ownership in this period 
makes it possible to make reliable statistical analysis on their relative performance. The 
drawbacks are that the financial data is quite uncertain in this volatile period, and that 
the data is not updated. Based on the data for the early years 1992-1995 it is found that 
management ownership had a higher incidence in small enterprises, but employee 
ownership had a quite high frequency both in small and large enterprises (see Mygind, 
1994). The data for the early years do not indicate a bias in direction of low capital-
intensity for insider- owned enterprises as it was the case in Estonia and Latvia (see 
Jones and Mygind, 1999). In Lithuania, high capital intensity has not blocked takeovers 
by employees, because vouchers combined with a preferential price favoured the group 
of employees. There does not seem to be a selection bias according to profitability (see 
Mygind, 1997).  
The early data from 1993-1994 show that for growth of sales employee-owned 
enterprises followed the average, while domestic outside-owned enterprises were below 
the average. Insider-owned enterprises had quite high labour-productivity, and 
employee-owned enterprises had for a wage level above the average in 1994. 
Employee-owned enterprises were doing well compared to other groups both in 
relation to profit margin and return on assets. Management-owned enterprises were 
around the average. Insider-owned enterprises had relatively low bank loans and low 
investment levels (see Mygind, 1997, pp. 49-79). A cross section analysis on factor 
productivity levels for the early data shows no clear tendencies of variation between 
employee-owned firms and other owner groups (see Jones and Mygind, 2000, pp. 415-
439).  
The 405 enterprise survey shows that manager- and employee-owned enterprises have 
relatively low salaries for managers, which can partly be explained by lower average size 
(see Mygind, 2002). The average wage for all employees is also lower in these firms. 
The survey investigates five indicators of restructuring: change in products, production 
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process, markets, suppliers and organizational structure. There was an increase in the 
changes over the period for all enterprises with organizational change as the most fre-
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quent type of restructuring. Employee-owned firms were relatively low on products, 
production and markets, but quite high in finding new suppliers. Insider-owned 
enterprises have, on average, a slow development in exports, but much of this can be 
explained by different weights in the distribution on industries. Insider-owned 
enterprises have relatively low investment levels. Combined with the analysis on 
sources of finance it confirms earlier findings (Mygind, 2001) that lack of capital is a 
barrier for insider-owned enterprises.  
The recent case study on the IT company Information technologies shows that one of 
the positive results of employee financial participation in IT industry is employee 
stability, only two of eight members of the team, which founded the company, have 
left. Other positive results are the increase in company share value, turnover and 
profitability growth. Earned profit is also used for annual dividend payments. Value 
added per employee has reached 161,000 Litas in 2002. The company has also 
evaluated another labour productivity measure - value added per employee per hour as 
equal to 24.9 Euro. This ratio exceeded average ratio for the EU service sector (24 
Euro).15
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The current level of development of financial participation of employees is relatively 
low. Before summer 1995, there has been strong support for employee ownership, but 
most regulations on preferential treatment of employees were abolished afterwards. 
Seldom, profit-sharing is used by individual firms. The number of co-operatives, 
especially workers’ co-operatives, is small. The number of self-employed persons is 
high due to advantageous taxation. Recently, employers have been paying more 
attention to the motivation of employees, i.e. by financial means, because of the 
problem of increasing emigration of skilled workers. Employee majority enterprises 
had, at least in the early years, relatively high productivity, but lower level of salaries 
and lower capitalisation.  
Employee share ownership emerged as a result of privatization. At the initial stage of 
privatization 1991-1995, employee-buy-outs at a discount combined with the extensive 
use of vouchers by the employees and leasing with the option to buy have led to a high 
percentage of employee ownership After most of preferential rights of employees were 
abolished in 1995, employee ownership changed partly to management and then to 
outsider ownership, whereby the concentration of ownership increased.  
                                                 
15  Source: Interview with company management conducted in April, 2005. http://www. 
informacinestechnologijos.Litas. 
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Financial participation of employees is only scarcely regulated. Companies can issue 
special employee shares in the course of capital increase which can not be owned by
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the management. These shares can be sold only to other employees and no voting 
rights are attached to the shares during the restriction period. The shares can be paid 
for in instalments and/or by deductions from the salary, but the corporation is not 
allowed to put pressure on employees in order to force them to purchase shares or to 
pay for shares by deduction. Profit sharing is not regulated. 
The EU accession has not influenced the development of participation of employees in 
Lithuania as yet, apart from the legislation on the involvement of employees in 
decision-making in European Companies and on European Works Councils in 
Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings. Some 
practices of financial motivation of employees used by branches of Western European 
firms in Lithuania were taken over also by some domestic companies.  
The government and the social partners do not support financial participation of 
employees presently. Combating unemployment, increasing salaries and improvement 
of working conditions are dominating the political agenda. Although financial 
participation could help solving some of these problems it is not taken into 
consideration. If EU regulation were introduced, it would probably change the attitude 
of the Lithuanian lawmaker. 
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